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Monopolist Strategies in a Durable Goods Market 





In his classical model for a durable goods monopoly, Ronald Coase conjectured that a 
monopoly will never be able to charge a price above the equilibrium competitive price 
and the monopoly will end up forgoing dominant market power. Under certain 
circumstances, the ideas in the Coase conjecture break down, which we can see in the 
high-end fashion industry. In this paper, we will analyze some classical and modern 
contributions in the field of a durable goods monopolist. Based on the ideas of various 
contributors, we introduce a new model while less formidable vividly presents the 




The durable goods market poses numerous issues that contribute to the depth of 
microeconomic analysis involved in studying the subject. A monopoly firm faces the 
direct burden of determining optimal pricing and quantity decisions. Therefore, 
combining the durable goods market with a dominant monopoly power provides an arena 
of questions to be explored. In 1972 a classical economists, Ronald Coase sparked the 
study of the durable goods market. He concluded that the behavior of a durable goods 
monopolist is not optimal and suggested some mechanisms to prevent the adverse results.  
 Based on his assumptions, many theories evolved studying the durable goods 
market. As the study in the field advanced, the depth of the problem involved called for 
the authors to approach the issue from different angles. The model developed by 
Pessendorfer stands as an example of diversification in the topic, whereas, the model by 
Bagnoli et al provides further questions to be analyzed. 
 Combining the ideas of Coase, Pessendorfer, Bagnoli et al, and game theory ideas 
we present a new model that is much simpler to understand. The model provides insight 
into the problem and presents an additional strategy that has never been presented before. 
We also introduce a flexibility option for the monopolist. If the goal of the monopolist is 
to limit the number of rounds of price decline, we then have an optimal strategy the 
monopolist can utilize. Similarly, if the goal of the monopolist is to reduce the total 
decline in the price of the durable good, we then have another optimal strategy the 




The 1970s saw the emergence of a great deal of literature concerning the durable goods 
monopolist. One of the earliest works was contributed by Peter Swan, who considered the 
question of optimal durability (Swan 1970, Sieper and Swan 1973). The other major 
contribution in the field was advanced by Ronald Coase in the year 1972.  Due to the 
nature of the durability of the good, the value of the good that will be sold in the future is 
directly affected by the behavior of the monopolist in the present. Therefore, with all the 
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incentives and constraints the monopolist faces, Coase conjectured that the production 
behavior of the monopolist is not optimal and that the producer will earn zero monopolist 
power (Coase). Based on his assumptions and arguments, numerous theories emerged.  
Most of the theories were focused on deriving a formal proof of the results 
conjectured by Coase or the theories were based on testing the robustness of Coase’s 
result. Bulow, for example, showed that under similar assumptions as Coase, renting a 
durable good is always more profitable than selling it (Bulow). Similarly, Stokey showed 
that precommiting to a time path of prices increases the monopolist’s profits (Stokey 
1979). Furthermore, Stokey in a later paper formally derived results that confirm the 
Coase conjecture (Stokey 1981).  
 Since our model is based on the ideas of Coase, Pessendorfer, and Bagnoli et al, 
we will take a brief look at these models.  
 
3. Coase Conjecture 
 
To understand the conjecture, consider a hypothetical situation where one person owns 
all the land in the U.S. Assume that the land is of uniform quality, the ownership of the 
land yields no utility to the owner, and that the owner can not work the land himself. In 
addition, assume that the marginal cost is zero and that there is no cost involved in 
disposing of the land. Given this situation, the owner has every incentive to sell the land 
and derive as much revenue from it as possible (Coase).  
Consider the following diagram. OB is the total land available. Assuming that the 
demand schedule is derived, the owner sells the portion of land where the marginal 
revenue is zero. This optimal level corresponds to point A in Figure 1. At point A, the 
seller sells OA portion of land and charges price P1, i.e. he sells a small portion of the 







Note that the owner still has AB portion of land left that yields no utility and he 
can not use the land himself. In this case, he can sell more land and increase his revenue. 
Due to the downward sloping demand curve, to increase the supply the land owner has to 
charge a lower price. If he decreases the price of the additional land not sold, then the 
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value of the OA portion of land will also fall. The buyers who bought the land at price P1 
will suffer from a loss of valuation of their land. At the same time, if the owner keeps 
increasing supply and reducing price, he builds the reputation of price decline. With this 
reputation built, no buyer will be willing to pay above the equilibrium price for the land 
as they will expect the price to fall in the future (Coase).  
 
3a. Conclusion 
Based on this kind of situation Coase conjectured that if there is no cost involved 
in the disposing of the land, all the land will be sold and the entire process will take place 
very fast. No buyer will pay above the equilibrium price, the price becomes independent 
of the number of suppliers, and the price is equal to the equilibrium price (Coase). The 
model implies that the seller will eventually have no monopoly power and derive no 
monopoly profit. In many real life cases, it is in the interest of the producer to maintain or 
create significant market power. Therefore, the results conjectured by Coase are certainly 
undesired.  
 
4. Pessendorfer’s Model (P-Model) 
 
In the paper entitled “Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles”, Pessendorfer explains the 
reasoning behind periodic design innovation introduced by a monopolist. Using a fashion 
good as a signaling device, he describes a dynamic game between the consumers. In 
explaining the dynamic game and the monopolist behavior, he considers the willingness 
of consumers to react with the “right” consumers. The consumers use the fashionable 
good as a signaling device and want to date consumers that are equal to or better off than 
themselves. Therefore, this willingness of consumers to pay certain prices to be able to 
meet other consumers determines the demand for the design (Pessendorfer). 
 Assume there is only one designer, who faces a fixed cost of innovation. Assume 
the buyers can be of two types, high-type or low-type. Buyers like the product not for 
their own sake, but because the product allows them to signal their quality. The buyers 
want to signal their quality because they are involved in a matching game in which each 
person desires to match up with a high-type person rather than a low-type person. The 
product sold is a durable good of which the consumer can use exactly one unit at a time 
(Pessendorfer).  
    
4a. Conclusion 
 For large fixed costs, fashion cycles are long because the designer has to sell at a 
higher price, which requires the design to stay fashionable longer. Similarly, short 
periods imply the designer’s profit is close to zero as he is unable to commit to a fixed 
time interval between price changes. According to the model, it is this variation in 
demand that creates fashion cycles. After a certain portion of buyers have purchased the 
design, it is profitable to introduce a new design and make the old design obsolete. The 
producers invest in introducing periodic updates because consumers are willing to pay 
higher prices for the design and the producer can derive higher profits from periodic 
changes in the design. Furthermore, the model explains that the sale of a new design 
occurs because the design goes out of fashion, and buyers anticipate it (Pessendorfer).  
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 In the paper titled “Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets”, Waldman 
argued that style changes might be common not only because of the demand side effect, 
but because style changes make used units less suitable for new units and hence allow the 
producer to increase the price of new units (Waldman 2003).  
 
5. The Discrete Demand Model (D-Model) 
 
As the title suggests, the model developed by Bagnoli et al, considers a finite collection 
of buyers rather than a continuum one. All the theories that we have analyzed so far and 
most of the other authors consider a continuum set of buyers and an infinite time horizon. 
By changing the distribution of buyers, which is considered an innocuous simplification, 
the authors negate most of the conclusions found in the durable goods monopoly theory.   
 The authors divide the model into two parts. The first part deals with the seller 
side of the market and the later part with the consumer side. The seller analyzes the 
maximum reservation price that a buyer is willing to pay and offers the product to the 
buyer with highest reservation price. This strategy is called a myopic strategy because the 
seller observes the highest reservation price and offers the good for that price. The second 
part deals with the consumer’s side. The only factor that the consumers consider while 
purchasing the product is whether the price falls within their reservation price. This type 
of strategy of consumers is called the “get-it-while-you-can” strategy (Bagnoli et al).  
  
 5a. Conclusion 
Analyzing a dynamic game between the buyers and the seller, the author 
concludes that “get-it-while-you-can” strategy is a sequential best reply for any buyer 
who can obtain zero utility in all future periods when the other players use their 
equilibrium strategies. Myopic monopoly strategy and the get-it-while-you-can strategy 
for each buyer form a subgame perfect equilibrium. The authors also conclude that for a 
sufficiently high discount factor, there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the 
monopolist extracts the entire consumer surplus (Bagnoli et al).  
The other conclusions are of utmost importance. The idea that renting or 
precommiting to price path is profitable does not hold true. That is, Bulow’s proposition 
that asserts renting a durable good is always more profitable than selling it is false. 
Similarly, Stokey’s theory that precommiting to a time path of prices is always optimal is 
also false under the assumption of a discrete distribution of buyers. Moreover, Coase’s 
proposition that in the continuous time limit of the infinite-horizon game, the price would 
quickly drop to the competitive level still holds true but, his conjecture that avers that no 
sales would take place before the competitive level was reached is  delusive (Bagnoli et 
al).  
 
6. The New Model  
 
Assume a high-end fashion industry with a sole designer, who faces a constant marginal 
cost of innovation. There are a finite set of buyers having different elite status based on 
their disposable income. The buyers are involved in a dating game in which each buyer 
would like to be matched with another buyer of elite status equal to or higher than 
themselves. Each buyer has a certain tolerance level that indicates how tolerant the 
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person is. Based on the tolerance level and elite status, a range of reservation price for 
each buyer is calculated. The range of reservation price can be interpreted as the 
maximum and minimum price each buyer is willing to pay for a single unit of the design. 
If the price exceeds the maximum reservation price, then the buyers do not prefer the 
design. Similarly, if the price falls beyond the minimum price limit, then the buyers 
perceive the product as being of inferior quality. The maximum and minimum reservation 
price form an upper and lower bound on the possible reservation price of a buyer. 
 It is assumed that the producer is able to observe the range of reservation prices, 
gather information about the total number of buyer, and different tolerance levels of each 
buyer. On the demand side, once elite status buyers purchase the design, all buyers have 
incentive to buy the design. The buyers are willing to corporate with other buyers whose 
elite status falls within their tolerance level. Based on this information, the designer 
offers different prices and decides the optimal point of new innovation. It is important for 
the designer to maintain his/her reputation among the upper-elite consumers. Therefore, it 
is not in his best interest to lower the price just to have additional consumers purchase the 
good or to have extremely frequent price declines.  
 
7. Definition of Variables 
  
“In-Group”: It refers to the group of buyers who have purchased a current design and are 
involved in the dating game. 
 
Tag Value (t): The tag value is a number assigned to each buyer based on their elite 
status. It is a number from 0 to 1. A tag value closer to 0 implies higher elite status. 
 
Tolerance level (l): The tolerance level is defined as the willingness of each buyer with a 
certain tag value to corporate with buyers with a lower tag value. In other words, it 
measures the willingness of a buyer to date other consumers with lower elite status. 
 
Maximum Reservation Price (Pmax ): It denotes the maximum price a buyer is willing to 
pay to acquire a single unit of the design. It is an upper bound on the price a buyer is 
willing to pay 
 
Minimum Reservation Price (Pi ): It is the minimum price a buyer is willing to pay to 
acquire a single unit of the design. If the price is below the minimum reservation price, 
then the buyer perceives the design as being inferior in quality. It can also be interpreted 
as the lowest price the buyer is willing to pay such that other buyers with lower elite 
status will be tolerated when joining the “in-group”. The minimum reservation price 
serves as a lower bound on the price a buyer is willing to pay. 
 
Total Number of Buyers (N): It represents the total number of buyers in the market and  
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8. Calculation of Variables 
 Tag Value (t) 
 As mentioned earlier, the tag value is a number between 0-1 assigned to each 
buyer based on their elite status. The interval, 0-1 will be divided into any number of 
equal parts. Assume that we divide the interval into n+1 equal parts, i.e. 0, 1/n, 2/n, ….. 
n-1/n, n/n = 1. In this model, after determining the number of equal parts, the 
denominator remains fixed. Ignoring the denominator, we are now concerned with 
assigning a numerator value to each buyer that will ultimately determine their tag value. 
This numerator value will be assigned to buyers according to a binomial distribution. 
 There are several reasons why a binomial distribution works very well in the 
model. First of all, we are concerned with a discrete distribution of buyers. Secondly, the 
distribution of buyers needs to be realistic. In the real world, there are relatively few 
people in the high-elite side with many buyers in the mid-elite status. With this in mind, 
the shape of an approximate binomial distribution simulates the distribution of buyers in 
the real world. The third reason is that we can easily extend the binomial distribution to 
approximate a continuum distribution of buyers. If we have n sufficiently large, then a 
normal distribution will approximate a binomial distribution very well. 
 Let, p denote the probability of success, 0 < p < 1, where the distribution of 
buyers is b(n+1, p). We can use the probability mass function of a binomial distribution 
to calculate the probability that a buyer will be assigned certain numerator value of a tag 













is the range of tag values with the possibility that 
more than one buyer can be assigned the same tag value. 
 
 Minimum Reservation Price ( iP ) 
 Pi corresponds to the minimum reservation price of buyer i.  
Pi  = ).1(*max ii tP −−   (i) 
Where, max−iP is the maximum reservation price and it  is the tag value of buyer i.  
Note that, the more elite the buyer is the lower is his/her tag value. The lower the tag 
value, the higher is the minimum reservation price. This means that the consumers at the 
upper-elite status are willing to pay a higher price for the design than those at a lower-
elite status. 
 
 Tolerance Level (l) 
 L = { }αlll ,...,, 21  is the set of tolerance levels corresponding to each buyer.  





P        (ii) 
Where, EP  is the equilibrium price of the design if the design was sold in a competitive 
market and iP  is the minimum reservation price as calculated in Equation (i). The more 
elite the consumers are the higher is their minimum reservation price which will yield a 
corresponding lower tolerance level. Therefore, the more elite the consumers are the 
more intolerant they are towards other consumers.  
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9. Part I 
 
Part I deals with the supply side of the model. Assuming that the producer has access to 
calculate the given variables, there are two possible strategies. One strategy is the myopic 
strategy similar to the one in Bagnoli et al’s model and the other is to consider tolerance 
level when offering the product at a certain price. We will analyze each strategy in detail.  
 
 9a. Myopic Strategy 
 The producer observes the maximum reservation price of the buyer and offers the 
product to those buyers at the maximum reservation price. This strategy is called the 
myopic strategy.  
 Let, γ  be the price of the good at the time of innovation, (r1, r2) be the range of 
reservation price of buyer r, and (s1, s2) be the range of reservation price of buyer s where 
r1 > r 2 > s 1 > s2. Assume that r1 is the highest reservation price among all the buyers. 
The producer observes the maximum reservation price of all the buyers and offers the 
good at price, γ = r 1. In the second period, if s1 is greater than any other reservation 
prices, then the producer offers the good at price, γ = s1.  
  
9b. Strategy Using Tolerance Level 
In this case, the producer first observes the range of reservation prices of each 
buyer. If the ranges of reservation prices of buyers with different tag values overlap, the 
producer checks to see if the buyers are tolerant of one another. When both these 
conditions are satisfied, the producer will offer the design to the buyers at different tag 
values that are tolerant of one another and whose range of reservation prices overlap.  
Assume there are only two buyers in the market, buyer r and buyer s. Let, γ  be 
the price of the good at the time of innovation, (r1, r2) be the range of reservation price of 
buyer r, and (s1, s2) be the range of reservation price of buyer s, where  r1 > s1  > r2  > s2, 
i.e. the range (r1, r2) and (s1, s2) overlap. Let, rt  be the tag value of buyer r and st be the 
tag value of buyer s with rt < st . Let, rl and sl be the tolerance level of buyer r and s, 
respectively, with st + sl  <  rt + rl . Given this situation, we know that buyer r is higher in 
elite status than buyer s, and is willing to tolerate buyer s. The producer observes this and 
offers the product at price, γ such that r2 ≤  γ ≤ s1. The price will not be below r2, because 
the price will be below the minimum reservation price of buyer r.  Note that it is possible 
for r1 = r2 and/or s1 = s2.  
 
10. Part II 
 
When the producer offers the design at a certain price, the buyers purchase the design as 
long as the price is within the range of their reservation price. For example, if (r1, r2) is 
the range of reservation price for buyer r and γ is the price of the design such that r2 ≤ γ ≤ 
r1, then buyer r will purchase the design.  
 
Time of Innovation 
 Innovation of a new design occurs when the producer has derived profits and the 
maximum potential additional revenue is less than the current profit. Assume R is the 
profit from selling the design to x number of buyers, so there will be N-x buyers left to 
 
 8  
purchase the good. Let, λ be maximum possible revenue from N-x buyers. If R > F,  then 
it is more profitable to innovate than to continue decreasing the price. The following 
example will make this idea apparent. 
 
Example 1 
Total number of buyers, N = 10,000 
Cost of Innovation, C = 1,000,000 
Probability of success, p = 0.3 
Equilibrium Price, EP = 200 














⎧ =  
i.e. n = 19 and n+1 = 20 
The Maximum Reservation Price of each buyer = maxP  
The Minimum Reservation Price of each buyer = iP  
Probability of assigning a tag value
19




+ −  







+ −  





















0 1700 1 1700 0.0008 0.118 8 8 
1 1600 0.947 1515.789 0.0068 0.132 68 68 
2 1550 0.894 1386.842 0.0279 0.144 279 279 
3 1300 0.842 1094.737 0.0716 0.183 716 716 
4 1200 0.789 947.3684 0.22679 0.211 2267.9 2267 
5 1100 0.736 810.5263 0.1789 0.247 1789 1789 
6 900 0.684 615.7895 0.1916 0.325 1916 1916 
7 800 0.631 505.2632 0.1643 0.396 1643 1643 
8 700 0.578 405.2632 0.11443 0.494 1144.3 1144 
9 600 0.526 315.7895 0.0653 0.633 653 653 
10 550 0.473 260.5263 0.0309 0.768 309 309 
11 500 0.421 210.5263 0.012 0.95 120 120 
12 450 0.368 165.7895 0.0038 1.208 38 38 
13 400 0.315 126.3158 0.001 1.583 10 10 
14 350 0.263 92.10526 0 2.171 0  
15 300 0.210 63.15789 0 3.167 0  
16 290 0.157 45.78947 0 4.368 0  
17 280 0.105 29.47368 0 6.786 0  
18 250 0.052 13.15789 0 15.2 0  
19 200 0.05 10 0 20 0  
Table 1 
 
 9  
 
(Note: we assume that the producer has mechanism to calculate maxP ). 
 
The value of "probability of i" in the fifth column is calculated using the binomial 
distribution or b(20,0.3). The values are an excerpt from the book “Probability and 
Statistical Inference” by Hogg and Tannis (Hogg and Tanis).  
 In Table 1, the first column represents the numerator of different tag values. The 
values in the second column are assumed to be derived using some marketing tool or 
other study, the tolerance level is calculated using the formula in Equation (ii). The 
expected number of buyers gives us the expected number of buyers with a certain tag 
value. This value will have great importance to the seller because he can calculate how 
many buyers he expects with a certain tag value. Since the number of buyers can not be a 
decimal number, we estimate by rounding the value to the lowest number.  
 
11. Myopic Strategy  
 
It is assumed that the buyers will use the "get-it-while-you-can-strategy". Following the 
myopic strategy, the producer will offer the product to the buyer with maximum 
reservation price. In Table 1, there are 8 consumers with tag value 0 who are willing to 
pay $1,700.00 for the design. Since this is the highest price any consumer is willing to 
pay, the producer will offer the design at a price of $1,700.00. Therefore, at time period 
T1 the price of the design is $1,700.00 and the revenue is $13,600.00 (8*$1,700.00). This 
revenue is not enough to offset the cost of $1,000,000.00.   
 This insufficient revenue induces the producer to reduce the price so that more 
consumers buy the design. In time period T2, the good will be offered at a price of 
$1,600.00 and 68 additional buyers will purchase the good. This process will continue 
until the producer is able to obtain a positive profit. At this point, the designer will 
consider the potential revenue generated by the consumers who have not purchased the 
design. 
 In the above example, at time period T4 the producer has positive profit equal to 
$485,650.00. Since the producer has positive profit now, he will consider his potential 
revenue from the buyers who have not yet purchased the design. The procedure for 
calculating maximum possible revenue is the same as the one that we have considered for 
calculating profit till T4.  In other words, the producer will follow myopic strategy and 
calculate revenue from consumers with tag value 4 till 19, i.e. if he were to continue until 
all the remaining consumers have purchased the design. Hence we calculate the 
maximum potential revenue from the consumers who have not yet purchased the design 
to be $9,170,750.00. The maximum potential revenue is greater than his current profit. 
Therefore, the producer will further decline the price and increase his profit. At time 
period T6 the producer will stop dropping the price further, sell the good at zero price, and 
at the same time introduce a new design because it is more profitable to innovate at this 
point than to continue dropping the price. Hence, we have 6 rounds of price decline, the 
total decline in price is $600.00, and the total profit is $517, 3950.00.  
 When he introduces a new design, the identical sequence of events takes place 
and the producer's profit and number of price declines will be the same in each 
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12. Strategy Using Tolerance Level 
 
Recall that under this strategy two conditions need to be satisfied. First of all, the buyers 
must be willing to corporate with each other and secondly, their range of reservation 
prices must overlap. In Table 1, the buyers at tag value 0 have a tolerance level of 0.1. 
This means that those buyers are willing to corporate with other buyers with tag value 
less than or equal to 0.1 (0+0.1, i.e. their tag value+ tolerance level). However, the buyers 
at tag value 0 are willing to pay only $1700 for the product and nothing less. Therefore, 
the range of reservation price of buyers with tag value 0 and with tag value 
19
1 does not 
overlap. In this case, in time period T1, the producer offers the product at price of $1700 
to the buyers with tag value 0. 
 In the time period T2, the producer again considers whether the two conditions for 
applying the strategy is met. Buyers with tag value 
19
1  are willing to corporate with 
buyers with tag value 
19
3  and their range of reservation prices do not overlap, but buyers 
with tag value 
19
1  are willing to corporate with buyers with tag value 
19
2  and their range 
of reservation prices also overlap. Hence, the producer will offer the design at price 
$1550 so that the buyers with tag value 
19
1  and 
19
2  will purchase the design at the same 
time. The process continues until the seller is able to obtain positive profit. He analyses 
maximum potential revenue as in the case of the myopic strategy. The decision of 
optimal time for innovation is the same for both strategies. Following the same sequence 
of events, the series of price decline ceases at time period T3 with 3 rounds of price 
decline, a total decline in price of $600, and a total profit of $4800650. The following 
diagram gives a pictorial view of the two strategies and the results.  
 





A simulation with different number of buyers, different probabilities, and different 
reservation prices was conducted. The range of variation in the number of buyers was 
from 10,000, 30,000, and 50,000. The probability was tested for p = 0.25 to p =0.5. 
Different probability values alter the tag value distribution of the buyers. If the 
probability of success is higher then there are few buyers with upper-elite status. 
 
13a. Myopic Strategy  
For a fixed probability, as the total number of buyers increases the total profit 
increases, the total rounds of price decline is likely to increase, and the total decline in 
price is either the same or decreases. If the probability p of success is low, the myopic 
strategy and the strategy using tolerance levels yield equal reductions in price. However, 
the total rounds of price decline and the total profit is greater using the myopic strategy. 
If the goal is sole profit maximization without consideration towards reducing the total 
rounds of price decline, the myopic strategy is the optimal strategy. 
 
13b. Strategy using Tolerance level 
Under the condition of low probability of success, if the goal of the monopolist is 
to reduce the total rounds of price decline, the tolerance level strategy is optimal. In 
simulations where the total number of buyers remains fixed, as probability of success 
increases, the total rounds of price decline increases. With increasing probability of 
success, the total decline in price also increases and the total profit decreases. We can not 
compare the total profit using the myopic strategy and the tolerance level strategy, 
because it does not follow a recognizable pattern. The strategy using tolerance levels 
almost always out-performs the myopic strategy in terms of reducing the total rounds of 
price decline. The total decline in price is also generally higher when using the tolerance 









p = 0.25         
 Myopic Strategy    Tolerance Level Strategy 



























10000 6 600 6672800  10000 3 600 6151378
30000 6 600 22018400  30000 3 600 20746700





N = 10000         
 Myopic Strategy    Tolerance Level Strategy 




















0.25 6 600 6672800  0.25 3 600 6151378
0.3 6 600 5173950  0.3 3 600 4800650
0.35 8 900 4909500  0.35 4 1000 5218150
0.4 8 900 4162550  0.4 3 900 3687800
0.45 9 1000 3481300  0.45 4 1250 4152900
0.5 9 1000 2930600  0.5 4 1250 3392200
Table 3 
 
If the monopolist wants to always reduce the total rounds of price decline and is 
not concerned about the total decline in price, then strategy using the tolerance levels is 
optimal. In an extreme case where the two conditions for using the strategy with 
tolerance can not be met, the myopic strategy is the only possible strategy. From 
simulations, it is also clear that the higher the cost of innovation, the longer is the period 
for which the good remains fashionable. At the same time, having fewer buyers with high 
elite status produces the same result as having a high cost of innovation. In both cases, 
the rounds of price decline are greater.   
 These results are obtained from numerous simulations and lack a theoretical 
proof. Given the model and the strategies, a theoretical proof of the conclusions remains a 
less daunting task. It is also to be noted that the efficiency of the strategies need to be 
tested. We have conclusions from the strategies but not enough tools to determine the 




 13  
14. Strengths and Weaknesses  
 
The simplicity is one of the biggest advantages of the model. The model is a rich 
combination of ideas from several theories and the functioning of the model is most 
apparent with the examples. Introduction of ideas like tolerance level and the binomial 
distribution makes the model interesting and flexible. Unlike Bagnoli et al's model, the 
new model presents two possible strategies and we obtain different results from each 
strategy.  
 We still need to develop theoretical proofs of the conclusions. Though we have 
many simulations, we have yet to determine patterns that can predict certain behavior of 
the monopoly. Furthermore, the efficiency of the strategies needs to be theoretically 
tested. One other aspect of the model that can be a potential drawback is the lack of 
incorporating a discount factor into the model.  
 The model can be easily extended to a continuum case and then the difference 
between the discrete and continuum case can be analyzed. So far, all theories in the 
durable goods market consider constant cost of innovation. Having an increasing cost of 
innovation can significantly increase the complexity involved in analyzing the model. 
This is one more area that needs to be explored. Also, we can use some real life data to 
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